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I. Introduction
Lessons from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women' ("CEDAW") for the interpretation and
application of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa2 ("African Protocol") are
multiple, and will vary according to the issue. This Article argues that
Article 12 of CEDAW,3 which guarantees women's right to the highest
attainable standard of health, including reproductive health, has to be
interpreted in light of that treaty's foundational articles, particularly Articles
2(f)4 and 5(a),5 which require the elimination of wrongful gender
stereotyping. Since the African Protocol also requires States Parties to
ensure women's right to the highest attainable standard of health6 and to
eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping, 7 it is hoped that some insights
1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Simone Cusack & Rebecca J.
Cook, Combating Discrimination Based on Sex and Gender, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinin, eds., 2009).
2. Protocol to the Afiican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, Sept. 13, 2000, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/ILEG/66.6 [hereinafter African
Protocol]; Fareda Banda, Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa,
in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE
(Malcolm Evans et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).
3. See CEDAW, Art. 12 (requiring States Parties to: "take all appropriate measures
to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a
basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related
to family planning;" and, "ensure to women appropriate services in connection with
pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as
well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation").
4. See id. Art. 2(f) (requiring States Parties to: "take all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices
that constitute discrimination against women").
5. See id. Art. 5(a) (requiring States Parties to take all appropriate measures
to: "modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women").
6. See African Protocol, Art. 14 (requiring States Parties to respect, protect and fulfill
women's right to the highest attainable standard of health, including sexual and reproductive
health).
7. See id. Arts. 2(2) (requiring State Parties to: "modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of women and men... with a view to the elimination of harmful cultural
and traditional practices and all other practices which are based on the idea of inferiority or
the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men."), 4(2)(d)
(requiring States Parties to: "take appropriate and effective measures to... eradicate
STEREOTYPING WOMEN IN THE HEALTH SECTOR
might be derived from CEDAW that are useful to the interpretation and
application of that Protocol.
This Article examines how stereotyping women can impair or nullify
their access to reproductive health care, in violation of CEDAW. In so
doing, it argues that in order to eliminate discrimination against women,
and indeed to prevent other violations of their human rights in the
reproductive health context, greater priority needs to be given to combating
wrongful stereotyping of women. The Article begins in Part II by
examining some of the most socially pervasive and persistent gender
stereotypes that impact the availability, accessibility, acceptability and
quality of reproductive health care for women. It explores the contextual
factors of those stereotypes, and examines how their application,
enforcement, or perpetuation in various laws, policies and practices can
discriminate against women, or violate other human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Using the framework set forth in CEDAW, Part III explores
States Parties' obligations to eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping that
violates women's access to reproductive health care. It continues by
canvassing some of the measures that States Parties might adopt in order to
dismantle the stereotypes that continue to thwart women's equal exercise
and enjoyment of the right to the highest attainable standard of health. The
Article concludes in Part IV by reflecting on some of the lessons learned
under CEDAW regarding States Parties' obligations to eliminate
stereotyping.
II. Understanding Gender Stereotyping in the Health Sector
A. Wrongful Gender Stereotyping: An Obstacle to Women's
Reproductive Health
Women regularly face obstacles in accessing reproductive health care
services and information, especially in the area of family planning. The
nature, frequency and immutability of obstacles vary greatly, depending on
such factors as a woman's age, race, religion, sexual orientation, and
geographical location. A woman with a disability might experience
difficulty in gaining access to a doctor with expertise in women's
elements in traditional and cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes which legitimize and
exacerbate the persistence and tolerance of violence against women"), and 12(l)(b)
(requiring States Parties to: "take all appropriate measures to eliminate all stereotypes in
textbooks, syllabuses and the media, that perpetuate such discrimination").
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reproductive health, in a clinic that meets her physical access or other
needs. A woman living in a rural area might have difficulty gaining timely
access to emergency contraception, and therefore be denied the opportunity
to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of her children,
due to the unavailability of that contraceptive in a geographically accessible
pharmacy.9 Similarly, a lesbian' ° or single" woman might be denied access
to assisted reproductive technologies on account of her sexual orientation or
marital status, respectively.
While the obstacles that impair or nullify women's access to
reproductive health care are undeniably varied, this Article contends that
wrongful gender stereotyping is a socially pervasive and persistent obstacle
that requires closer scrutiny. The stereotype of women as primarily
mothers, for example, has been applied, enforced, and perpetuated through
laws, policies and practices that deny or restrict women's access to
affordable contraceptives and related health care services and information.'
2
Opponents of abortion rights have sought to perpetuate the stereotype of
women as weak and vulnerable and therefore in need of protection (the
"woman-protective" argument), in support of their efforts to abolish or
restrict women's access to abortion.' 3  The stereotype of women as
incompetent decision-makers has been enforced through laws, policies and
practices that, inter alia, allow the forcible sterilization of women.
1 4
8. Sue Salthouse, The Sick State of Health for Women with Disabilities, Paper
Presented at the Australian Women's Health Network 5th Australian Women's Health
Conference (April 20-22, 2005).
9. Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy
Implications of Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 469, 522 (2006); Lisa R.
Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural, 2 UTAH L. REV. 421 (2007).
10. Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic.) (Austl.), No. 76 of 2008, § 10
(explicitly granting, for the first time in Victoria, Australia, lesbians access to assisted
reproductive treatment).
11. McBain v. Victoria, 99 FCR 116 (Federal Court of Australia 2000) (invalidating
section 8(1) of the (now repealed) Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic.) (Austl.), No. 63 of
1995, which denied single women access to infertility treatment).
12. See infra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 94-119 and accompanying text
14. CEDAW Committee (A.S. v. Hungary), Communication No. 4/2004, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004 (2006) (finding Hungary in violation of its obligations under
CEDAW to protect women against forcible sterilization); Maria Mamrita Mestanza Chdivez
v. Peru, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 71/03, OEA/Ser.IV/II. 118, doc. 5 rev. 2
(2003) (finding Peru in violation of its obligations under the Inter-American human rights
system to protect women against forcible sterilization).
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Stereotyping is not necessarily problematic. Stereotyping can, for
example, be a useful tool to help process the social complexity of the
world.' 5 As one commentator has explained:
[T]he real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too
fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so
much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and
combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we
have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with
it16
Stereotyping can also provide predictability and security. One can feel
comforted by the familiarity that arises from the repeated use of
stereotypes.17
Yet, history has shown that stereotyping has had particularly egregious
consequences for women. One feminist legal scholar has observed that a
useful way of examining the continued disadvantage of women is to
identify the assumptions and stereotypes which have been central to the
perpetuation and legitimation of women's legal and social
subordination. Such assumptions have roots which stretch deep into the
history of ideas, yet continue to influence the legal and social structure
of modem society. Indeed, the continuity is startling, given the extent
and fundamental nature of change in the political and economic
context. 18
So, while stereotyping is not inherently problematic, it becomes
problematic when it operates to ignore individual women's characteristics,
abilities, needs, wishes, and circumstances in ways that deny them their
rights, and when it creates gender hierarchies by constructing women as
inferior to men. 9
Uncovering how laws, policies and practices apply, enforce, or
perpetuate stereotypes of women is critical to understanding their gendered
experiences of discrimination and inequality. Examining how women are
stereotyped in the health context can provide important insights that foster
understanding of how, and in what ways, women are disadvantaged in
relation to the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of health
care services and information.
15. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 13-16.
16. WALTERLIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 16 (1922; repr. 1957).
17. Id. at 95.
18. SANDRA FREDMAN, WOMEN AND THE LAW 3 (1997).
19. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 59-68.
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If discrimination against women and other violations of their rights are
to be prevented in the health sector, greater priority needs to be given to
eliminating wrongful gender stereotyping. The ability to eliminate gender
stereotyping in the health sector is contingent on the wrong first being
named2" or, to borrow a medical metaphor, an ailment first needs to be
diagnosed in order for it to be treated.2' Exposing the operative gender
stereotypes, examining their origins, contexts, and means of perpetuation,
and analyzing how their application, enforcement, or perpetuation harms
women, are critical to this process.22 Once wrongful gender stereotyping
has been named, it is then possible to identify if, and how, operative gender
stereotypes impair or nullify women's rights to non-discrimination and
equality, and/or violate their other human rights.23 Assuming that a rights
violation is identified, efforts can also be made to work toward the
elimination of operative gender stereotypes, through the adoption of legal
and other measures.24
It is helpful at this juncture to consider what is meant by the terms
"gender stereotype" and "gender stereotyping." The term "gender
stereotype" is used in this Article to describe a generalized view or
preconception of attributes or characteristics possessed by, or the roles that
are or should be performed by, men and women, respectively.25 In this
view, a gender stereotype presumes that all individuals in the social groups
of men or women possess certain attributes or characteristics, behave in a
certain way, and/or perform specific, pre-determined roles. The term
"gender stereotyping" is used to describe a process of ascribing to an
individual person certain attributes, characteristics, or roles only by reason
26of his or her membership in the social group of men or women.
A particular characteristic of gender stereotypes is that they are
resilient; they are socially pervasive (by which is meant articulated across
social sectors and cultures) and persistent (meaning articulated over time).27
20. RuTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 7 (2004);
see also William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ..., 15 LAW & Soc'y. REv. 631 (1980).
21. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 3.
22. Id. at 45-58.
23. Id. at 59-70, 104-130.
24. Id. at 93-99.
25. Id. at 20-24.
26. PENELOPE J. OAKES, S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, & JOHN C. TURNER, STEREOTYPING
AND SociAL REALITY 1 (1994).
27. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How 'Color Blindness'
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REv. 77, 82 (2000)
STEREOTYPING WOMEN IN THE HEALTH SECTOR
Indeed, one commentator has recalled how an expert of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ("CEDAW Committee")
(the UN treaty body established to monitor States Parties' compliance with
CEDAW) observed that "she found it striking that in all the countries they
had considered,... gender stereotypes had proved extremely resistant to
change. While there was clearly greater equality in some countries than
others, stereotypes about men and women persisted. ,,28 Another
commentator has explained that gender stereotypes are among the obstacles
that states most frequently cite to the elimination of discrimination and the
realization of substantive equality.29 Stereotypes, she said, not only
perpetuate harmful practices, but also contribute to "a pervasive climate of
discrimination and at times backlash. Examples range from the continued
devaluation of women's labour in the home, to disadvantaged position in
the labour market to attacks on women's reproductive rights."3° She
described how, even in states where important strides have been made
toward the achievement of substantive equality, "gender roles and identities
continue to be shaped by patriarchal notions of 'femininity' and
'masculinity' .... Hence, progress toward gender equality continues to be
fragile and under constant threat from a conservative coalition, operating
globally and nationally ....
Conditions for social stratification and subordination of women exist
when practices, such as gender stereotyping, are both socially pervasive and
persistent.32 The conditions for social stratification and subordination are
exacerbated when stereotypes are institutionalized in states' laws, policies,
and practices. An example is the widespread institutionalization, through
judicial reasoning, of sexual stereotypes of women that condone and justify
sexual assault.3 3 The saturation of law with sexual stereotypes, such as the
[hereinafter Siegel, Eyes of the Law]; see also DAVID B. GRUSKY, ED., SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (3rd ed. 2008).
28. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 75 (2006).
29. Yakin Ertairk, Considering the Role of Men in Gender Agenda
Setting: Conceptual and Policy Issues, 78 FEMINIST REVIEW 3, 7 (2004).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Siegel, Eyes of the Law, supra note 27, at 82.
33. R v. Ewanchuk, 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can., Supreme Court 1999) (L'Heureux-Dubd J.,
concurring) (naming the sexual stereotypes enforced by the lower courts, explaining how
stereotyping harmed the complainant, and identifying how stereotyping influenced the lower
courts' decision to acquit the defendant); see also The Hon. Madame Justice Claire
L'Heureux-Dubd, Beyond the Myths: Equality, Impartiality, and Justice, 10 JOURNAL OF
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stereotype that women are in a state of perpetual consent to sexual activity,
has contributed to the frequent blaming of victims and survivors of sexual
assault34 and, for example, the denial of female sexual agency and the
privileging of male sexuality.
35
Gender stereotypes are shaped by the contexts in which they operate.
In order to accurately diagnose and effectively treat them, it is therefore
important to understand the underlying context in which they are applied,
enforced, or perpetuated. One approach to understanding context is to think
about it in terms of individual factors, situational factors in different
sectors, and broader factors.36 Understanding these factors can help to
explain how gender stereotyping contributes to the conditions for the social
stratification or subordination of women,37 how it is perpetuated, and the
process by which it might be eliminated.38
As individuals,39 we absorb stereotypes through our everyday
interactions with people and exposure to culture.40 Repeated encounters
embed those stereotypes deep into our subconscious minds, 4' where we
(often) come to accept them uncritically as a "normal" understanding of the
world and begin to act in conformity with them.
42 Situational factors43
provide insights into how an individual is "affected by and adapts to social
contexts, ranging from proximal influences (e.g., the norms of one's
immediate work group) to more distal influences (e.g., the division of male
SOcIAL DIsTREss & THE HOMELESS 87 (2001), at 89-90.
34. CEDAW Committee, Report on Mexico Produced by the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to
the Convention, and Reply From the Government of Mexico, CEDAW, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (2005), paragraph 67.
35. See, e.g., R. v. Ewanchuk, 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can., Supreme Court 1999).
36. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 31-36.
37. Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender
Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 CoLuM. J. GENDER & LAW 2, 39-55 (1998).
38. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 36-38.
39. Id. at 32.
40. L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 33, at 89.
41. Id.
42. Deborah L. Rhode & Joan C. Williams, Legal Perspectives on Employment
Discrimination, in SEx DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 235, 245 (Faye L. Crosby, Margaret S. Stockdale & S. Ann Ropp, eds., 2007);
Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, Sex Discrimination: The Psychological Approach, in SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 155, 157-58 (Faye
L. Crosby, Margaret S. Stockdale & S. Ann Ropp, eds., 2007).
43. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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and female roles in society)."44  In the health sector, for instance,
stereotypes about women emerge in regard to their capacity to make free
and informed decisions about their health care, moral agency to make
decisions about their reproduction and sexuality, and autonomy to
determine their own roles in society. Broader factors,45 such as historical,
cultural, religious, and legal considerations, can provide important insights
into how a group, community, or culture integrates a stereotype into its
social structures and meanings, and unearth the means to achieving their
46elimination.
There are many different means of perpetuating gender stereotypes
and understanding the different means is critical to dismantling
stereotypes.47 When a state applies, enforces, or perpetuates a gender
stereotype in its laws, policies, or practices, or fails to adopt legal measures
to eliminate and remedy wrongful gender stereotyping through means such
as school curricula or textbooks, it institutionalizes that stereotype and
gives it the force and authority of the law. As an institution of the state, the
law condones its operation and creates an environment of legitimacy and
impunity around its use. When a state legitimizes a gender stereotype in
this way, it creates a legal framework to enable the perpetuation of
discrimination against women.
B. Exposing Wrongful Gender Stereotyping in the Health Sector and
Understanding How it Impedes Women's Access to Health Care
This section analyzes three of the most socially pervasive and
persistent stereotypes of women that operate to impair or nullify their
access to reproductive health care. These are:
" the stereotype of women as primarily mothers, which implies
that women (and, conversely, not men) should prioritize
childbearing and childrearing over all other roles they might
perform or choose;
* the stereotype of women as weak and vulnerable, which
implies that women are in need of protection, through
restrictive laws, policies and practices; and,
44. Glick & Fiske, supra note 42, at 156.
45. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 33-36.
46. Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist
Legal Thought, 2 Wis. L. REv. 303, 305, 313-25 (1995).
47. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 36-38.
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* the stereotype of women as incompetent decision-makers,
which implies that women are irrational and lack the capacity
for moral agency and reproductive self-determination, and
should therefore be denied access to certain reproductive
health services (e.g., abortion services).
In addition to naming these stereotypes, this section examines their
contexts and means of perpetuation. It also analyzes how their application,
enforcement or perpetuation harms women and impairs or nullifies their
rights, on the basis of equality of men and women, to the highest attainable
standard of health, and to decide freely and responsibly on the number and
spacing of their children.
1. Impeding Women's Access to Contraceptives by Stereotyping Women
as Primarily Mothers
In 1872, in Bradwell v. Illinois,48 Justice Bradley of the U.S. Supreme
Court infamously reasoned that "[t]he constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. '4 9 He continued:
"[t]he harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. 50 As
if to avoid any potential confusion regarding his understanding of women's
value and "proper" role within society, Justice Bradley concluded that
"[tlhe paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother."'" In these three short sentences, Justice
Bradley perpetuated a number of different stereotypes of women-namely,
the stereotype of women as homemakers, the stereotype of women as wives
and the stereotype of women as mothers. It is this last stereotype of women
as mothers that is addressed here.
The stereotype of women as primarily mothers ascribes to women the
role of motherhood. It implies that women-and, conversely, not men-
48. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 137-38 (1872) (holding that a state court did
not violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause because it refused to admit a woman to
practice law).
49. Id. at 141 (Bradley J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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should prioritize childbearing and childrearing over all other roles they
might perform or choose. It further implies that women (but not men)
should make their children the centre of their universe and always put the
needs and interests of those children above their own. According to the
stereotype, nothing should be more important for women than the bearing
and rearing children, and ensuring their wellbeing.
At times, the use of the stereotype of women as primarily mothers is
descriptive, by which is meant that the stereotype is used to describe a role
(i.e., motherhood) that the overwhelming majority of women perform. At
other times, as in the case of Justice Bradley's reasoning, the stereotype is
used prescriptively-that is, to prescribe to women the role of motherhood.
Understood in this way, motherhood is something that all women-
irrespective of their distinctive reproductive health capacity, their individual
reproductive or other priorities (e.g., education or career aspirations), or
physical and emotional circumstances-ought to desire and "do." For
Justice Bradley, it was inconceivable that Myra Bradwell, the petitioner in
Bradwell v. Illinois, would want a career in the legal profession. In his
mind, she was a mother (whether actual or potential); she was not an
individual woman who might wish to pursue "a distinct and independent
career from that of her husband"52 or from that of motherhood.
It is significant that Justice Bradley seeks to justify his reliance on the
sex-role stereotype of women as primarily mothers by appealing to "the
divine ordinance," and by describing women's role as mothers as "the
nature of things" and "as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. 53 Motherhood, at least in his opinion, is "[t]he
paramount destiny and mission of woman. 0 4 In equating motherhood with
"the nature of things,"5 Justice Bradley attempts to put his reasoning about
women's role as mothers beyond reproach. He wants us to believe that
since this is "the way things are" for women, there is no point in arguing
that women might want to perform or choose some other role for
themselves, or to prioritize some, if not all, of their own needs and interests
above those of their children. According to Justice Bradley, women,
including Myra Bradwell, should just get on with the business of doing
what they should be doing, by virtue of their birth into the social group of
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It is easy to dismiss Justice Bradley's reasoning as anachronistic, an
uncomfortable reminder, perhaps, of a time when women were
preconceived of as primarily homemakers, wives, and mothers. However,
the stereotypes that underpin his reasoning--especially the stereotype of
women as primarily mothers-have worn a well-trodden path throughout
history and across cultures, and have regularly been institutionalized into
states' laws, policies and practices, sowing the seeds for the social
stratification and subordination of women. Indeed, as one feminist legal
scholar and former member of the CEDAW Committee has explained, the
stereotyping of women as primarily mothers is "globally pervasive."
56
One can point to many modem uses of the stereotype of women as
primarily mothers. Yet, one example that stands out, because of its
incorporation into a national constitution, the highest and most authoritative
law that underpins a state's entire existence, is the Constitution of Ireland of
1937 ("Irish Constitution").57 Article 41.2 of the Irish Constitution
provides:
1. In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home,
woman gives to the State a support without which the common good
cannot be achieved.
2. The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not
be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of
their duties in the home.
As in Justice Bradley's reasoning, the Irish Constitution equates
women with mothers; it prescribes to women the role of motherhood and
commends them for the "common good" they serve by performing their
"natural" roles and fulfilling their destiny as mothers. Yet, more than this,
the Government of Ireland, through its Constitution, imposes on women its
preference for how women should behave and the role they should perform
in Irish society, by proactively discouraging women from pursuing a role
other than motherhood: "mothers shall not be obliged by economic
necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.
'" 58
In this way, the Irish Constitution not only sends a message that women
ought to be mothers, but it also stigmatizes mothers who, without economic
56. Frances Raday, Culture, Religion, and CEDAW's Article 5(a), in THE CIRCLE OF
EMPOWERMENT: TwENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE UN COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 68, 71 (Hanna Beate Sch6pp-Schilling & Cees
Flinterman, eds., 2007).
57. CONSTrruTIONOF IRELAND, 1937, Art. 41.2.
58. Id. Art. 41.2.1.
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need, pursue a career in the paid workforce or their own interests outside
the home.
Evidence of the perpetuation of the stereotype of women as primarily
mothers can be found throughout time, in almost all sectors of society, from
the education sector,59  to marriage and family relations, 60 to the
employment sector. 61 Health is one sector, however, where its presence has
been particularly marked, but little explored. The stereotype of women as
primarily mothers has been applied in this sector, particularly in the
reproductive health context, to deny or impede women's access to safe and
lawful abortion,62 contraceptives, including emergency contraception,63 and,
for example, family planning information.64 Its application has harmed
59. See, e.g., Haines v. Leves, 8 NSWLR 442 (Austl., Court of Appeal of New South
Wales 1987) (holding that it was discriminatory to segregate students in single sex schools in
order to ensure curricula differences that reflected sex-role stereotypes of men as
breadwinners and women as homemakers, because this limited girls' future choices of
education, vocations and careers); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(finding that the University's decision to deny admission to its all-female nursing program to
an otherwise qualified male applicant because of his sex violated the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.).
60. See, e.g., Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 4/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001) (finding that, in enforcing sex-role
stereotypes in marriage and family relations, the impugned provisions of the Civil Code of
the Republic of Guatemala discriminated against the complainant); Deborah A. Widiss,
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex
Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007); Michelle O'Sullivan,
Stereotyping and Male Identification. 'Keeping Women in Their Place,' in GENDER AND THE
NEW SouTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 185 (Christina Murray, ed., 1994).
61. See, e.g., Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (discussing the
existence of the stereotype in the employment setting while ruling on the State's failure to
comply with the Family and Medical Leave Act); Joan C. Williams, et al., The Evolution of
'FRED': Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of
Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311 (2008); Joan C. Williams et al.,
Deconstructing the Maternal Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of "Careers"
in the Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 31 (2006).
62. See, e.g., Tysiac v. Poland, no. 5410/03 ECHR 219 (finding Poland had violated
the right to private life in Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, in failing
to ensure effective mechanisms capable of determining whether the conditions for a lawful
abortion had been satisfied); Rebecca J. Cook & Susannah Howard, Accommodating
Women 's Differences Under the Women 's Anti-Discrimination Convention, 56 EMORY L.J.
1039, 1040 (2007).
63. Smearman, supra note 9, at 540.
64. Declaring Total Commitment and Support to the Responsible Parenthood
Movement in the City of Manila and Enunciating Policy Declarations in Pursuit Thereof,
Exec. Order No. 003 (2000) (Phil.) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 003]; see also LIKHAAN, ET
AL., REPROCEN & CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, IMPOSING MISERY: THE IMPACT OF
MANILA'S CONTRACEPTION BAN ON WOMEN AND FAMILIES (2007).
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women in countless ways, including by neglecting their need for sex-
specific health services, expropriating their bodies, reducing their moral
agency and autonomy, and scripting them into traditional sex-roles
regardless of their individual reproductive health capacity and physical and
emotional circumstances, or their individual priorities.
A particularly harmful application of the stereotype of women as
primarily mothers can be seen in "Executive Order No. 003: Declaring
Total Commitment and Support to the Responsible Parenthood Movement
in the City of Manila and Enunciating Policy Declarations in Pursuit
Thereof," adopted in 2000 by the former Mayor of Manila City, Jose L.
Atienza, Jr. The Executive Order stipulates that Manila City "promotes
responsible parenthood and upholds natural family planning not just as a
method but as a way of self-awareness in promoting the culture of life
while discouraging the use of artificial methods of contraception like
condoms, pills, intrauterine devices, surgical sterilization, and others., 65 It
requires Manila City to, inter alia, establish programs and activities that
"promote and offer as an integral part of their functions counseling facilities
for natural family planning and responsible parenthood., 66 The Executive
Order has significantly impaired women's access to "artificial" methods of
contraception and related health care services in Manila City by prohibiting
their distribution in public health facilities.
67
In issuing the Executive Order, Atienza enforced the prescriptive
stereotype of women as primarily mothers; that is, he prescribed the role of
motherhood to women. The Executive Order sent a clear message that
women's natural role and destiny (at the very least in Manila City) is to be
mothers, meaning that women (and, conversely, not men) should prioritize
childbearing and childrearing over all other roles they might perform or
choose in that community. The implication is that women in Manila City
should be treated first and foremost as mothers (whether actual or potential)
and not according to their individual needs not to become mothers at certain
points in their lives. According to this stereotypical thinking, it is not
essential that women have access to affordable methods of artificial
contraception, since this could potentially deny women the opportunity to
fulfill their "duties" as mothers.
In order to fully understand the stereotype's application in the
Executive Order, it is important to consider the broader and situational
65. Exec. Order No. 003, supra note 64, paragraph 1.
66. Id. paragraph 2.
67. LIKHAAN ETAL., supra note 64, at 14.
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contextual factors that surrounded its application. For example, it is
significant that, at the time the Executive Order was introduced, there had
been a "growing Catholicization of public health policies,"69 and several
prominent state figures, including President Arroyo, justified the Order on
the ground that denying women access to artificial contraceptives is
consistent with the Catholic Church's teachings on family planning.7° State
officials sought to impose their views about women's "proper" role by
invoking Catholicism.
It is also significant that the Order was introduced in the broader
context of a legal culture that perpetuates stereotypes within family and
marriage relations with impunity. For example, in providing that, in the
case of disagreements over marital property or parental authority over
children, the husband's/father's decision shall prevail over that of the
wife's/mother's, the "Family Code of the Philippines of 1987" perpetuates
the prescriptive stereotype that men should be decision-makers and
therefore bear ultimate power and authority, including in reproductive and
71sexual matters. In so providing, the Family Code limits women's
reproductive and sexual choices, and makes reliance on natural family
planning, as practically required under the Executive Order,
[A]n inadequate, and potentially empty, choice for women, because their
ability to decide the number and spacing of their children depends
completely on the willingness of their partners to abstain from having
sex. This lack of a genuine choice deprives women of their right to
decide the number and spacing of their children.
72
Situational factors, including the widespread state practice of
rewarding women, through monetary compensation and other gifts, for
stereotype-conforming behavior (i.e., for fulfilling their natural "destiny" to
be mothers), has facilitated the institutionalization of the stereotype of
women as primarily mothers.73 For example, one report has described how
"[t]he mayor [of Manila City] gives prizes for having the most number of
children, and the current champion has 21 kids. 7 4 In addition, the state
68. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 54-56.
69. LLKHAAN, ET AL., supra note 64, at 12.
70. Id. at 14-15.
71. The Family Code of the Philippines, Exec. Order No. 209, arts. 96, 211 (1987)
(Phil.).
72. LIKHAAN, ET AL., supra note 64, at 41.
73. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 27.
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practice of harassing and intimidating health providers that give women
access to contraceptives has further facilitated the stereotype's
institutionalization. These practices have enabled the imposition of the
state's views of women's "proper" role in society; they have restricted
women to the role of motherhood and the behavior expected of mothers
(i.e., the prioritization of the needs of children over women). This has
taken place even where those practices pose serious--even fatal-risks to
women.
The introduction of the Executive Order has caused significant harm to
women, especially indigent women, in Manila City.75 Denying women
access to essential reproductive health care, particularly artificial
contraceptives, is the immediate and most obvious harm to women. As one
report has explained:
For most Filipinos, the government is the major source of family
planning services, with about 70% of people relying on the public sector
for services .... People who are living in poverty and marginalized in
society are especially dependent on government institutions to provide
affordable family planning services and other basic health care. The
policy declarations of the [Executive Order], which in essence ban all
artificial methods of family planning in city-funded health facilities,
affect all women in Manila who want to control their fertility, but
especially women who are poor. It is these women who face the
greatest barriers in accessing family planning methods, and tend more
often to suffer the physical, psycholo6gical, economic and social
consequences of unintended pregnancies.
The effect of denying women access to artificial means of
contraception has been to deprive them of the right to make an autonomous
decision to become, or not to become, mothers. Assuming that an
individual woman does want to become a mother at some point in her life,
its effect has also been to deprive her of the right to decide freely and
responsibly on the number and spacing of her children. Put simply, the
Order has harmed women by forcing them into the role of motherhood and
reducing them to their physiological capacity to bear children. 7
Forcing women into motherhood, particularly in the case of multiple
pregnancies, has further harmed women by jeopardizing their lives,
compromising their health through the imposition on them of the physical
75. Id. at 16-25.
76. Id. at 16.
77. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 361-62 (1992).
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burdens of procreation, and threatening their economic stability. Health
complications associated with too-frequent deliveries, limited spacing
between births, and underlying health conditions often associated with
complications during prior pregnancies have increased the potential for
harm to individual women.78 Moreover, it has been explained that, "[e]ven
in cases where women were advised that another pregnancy would threaten
their life or health, health personnel in Manila city hospitals could not
provide for the necessary medical intervention because of the [Executive
Order]. '79  In some cases, limited access to artificial contraceptives has
forced women to seek out underground and unsafe abortions, resulting in
the hospitalization of thousands, and the deaths of hundreds, of Filipino
women each year.80 Women who have tried to avoid pregnancy by refusing
sex with their partners have described the strain this puts on their
relationships and explained how this increases their risk of suffering sexual
violence. 8'
In actively discouraging use of artificial methods of contraception, the
Executive Order has stigmatized the distribution of those methods and their
use throughout the health system in Manila.82 Even where contraceptives
are available, the stigma associated with their use has prevented many
women from accessing and using them.83 There is also evidence that the
Order has had a "chilling effect" on women's access to contraceptives in
other areas of the Philippines and in independent facilities not legally
affected by the Executive Order. 84 Moreover, when health providers and
other actors have enabled women, through the provision of contraceptives,
to defy the prescriptive stereotype of women as mothers, they have been
subject to harassment and intimidation.85 In the most serious of cases, this
has resulted in the closure of facilities that provide contraceptives to
women, thereby further impeding women's equal ability to access essential
health care and decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of
their children. 6
78. LIKHAAN, ET AL., supra note 64, at 21.
79. Id. at 20.
80. Susheela Singh et al., Unintended Pregnancy and Induced Abortion in the
Philippines: Causes and Consequences 21-22 (Guttmacher Institute 2006).
81. LIKHAAN, ET AL., supra note 64, at 22-23.
82. Id. at 9; Exec. Order No. 003, supra note 64.
83. LIKHAAN, ET AL., supra note 64, at 34-35.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id. at 27-31.
86. Id. at 28-30.
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Further, the Executive Order rests on an underlying stereotypical
assumption that women are neither capable of fulfilling, nor should they
pursue, a role apart from motherhood. The act of confining women to
motherhood prevents them from pursuing an education or career outside the
domestic sphere of the family home and impedes their "full development
and advancement ... .,,7
In addition to the aforementioned harms, the reinforcement by the
Executive Order of the prescriptive stereotype of women as primarily
mothers has resulted in indirect discrimination against women, by which it
is meant that, although the Order is neutral on its face, (facially neutral), the
perpetuation of that stereotype has a detrimental and disproportionate effect
on women. 88 Consequently, while the Executive Order affects both men
and women in that it restricts access to contraceptives for both sexes, "only
women are exposed to the risk of unintended pregnancy and its health
consequences. Women also often disproportionately suffer its economic
and social consequences. In this way, the [Executive Order] deprives
women of their rights and development on a basis of equality with men." 89
Enforcement of the prescriptive stereotype of women as primarily
mothers is discriminatory when it implies that all women should be treated
only as mothers or potential mothers, and not according to their individual
needs not to become mothers at certain points in their lives. When states
incorporate such stereotypes into laws and policies that govern the delivery
of health care services, they discriminate against women.90  Such
stereotypes limit the ability of individual women to make autonomous
decisions about their health and their private and family lives, which may
conflict with their role as mothers or future mothers.91 Women's voluntary
role as mothers should always be taken into serious account, but women
87. CEDAW Art. 3.
88. Id. Art. 1; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, Art. 4 (30th
sess., 2004), Temporary Special Measures, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2004/I/WP. 1/Rev. 1
(2004), paragraph 7 n.1 [hereinafter CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No.
25]; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, Art. 2,
Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20
(2009), paragraph 10 [hereinafter CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 20];
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 16, The Equal
Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2005/4 (2005), paragraph 13 [hereinafter CESCR Committee, General
Comment No. 16].
89. LIKHAAN, ET AL., supra note 64, at 37.
90. Exec. Order No. 003, supra note 64.
91. LIKHAAN,ETAL.,SUpra note 64, at 16-27.
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should not be condemned by stereotyping when they choose to refrain from
having children or to space their children through use of artificial methods
of contraception. Women should be as free as men to select parenthood.
A state policy or a passive acceptance of institutional norms that relies
on stereotypical views of women as mothers restricts women's private and
family choices in a discriminatory manner. It has been explained that:
[T]he notion ... that women are to be regarded as the primary
care givers of young children, is a root cause of women's
inequality .... It is both a result and a cause of prejudice; a
societal attitude which relegates women to a subservient,
occupationally inferior yet unceasi 2gly onerous role. It is a relic
and a feature of... patriarchy 
....
It has been further explained that:
One of the ways in which one accords equal dignity and respect
to persons is by seeking to protect the basic choices they make
about their own identities. Reliance on the generalization that
women are the primary care givers is harmful in its tendency to
cramp and stunt the efforts of both men and women to form their
identities freely.93
Women's private choices of the design and composition of their
families should not be dictated by state authorities through the denial of
sex-specific health care services, or through the advancement of gender-
differentiated roles for women based on religious or cultural ideologies.
The design and composition of women's family lives is a matter of deep
personal and emotional significance. A state should not use its laws,
policies, and practices to impose stereotyped roles on women in ways that
diminish their capacity to make their own decisions regarding pregnancy
and parenthood.
2. Impeding Access to Abortion by Stereotyping Women as Weak,
Vulnerable and Incompetent Decision-makers
Just as the stereotype of women as primarily mothers has been used to
deny women access to contraceptives, and therefore deny their rights to
non-discrimination and equality and to decide freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their children, so, too, has it been used to deny
92. President of the Republic of S. Aft. v. Hugo, CCT1 1/96 (S. Aft. 1997),
paragraph 80.
93. Id.
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women access to abortion.94 The anti-abortion movement has consistently
advocated criminalization of abortion as a means of protecting unborn
life.95 However, the movement has not advocated the adoption of laws and
policies to protect prenatal life that are also compatible with women's
rights, such as clinical interventions to reduce miscarriages or health
systems measures to decrease neonatal deaths.96 A hidden-or perhaps not
so hidden-agenda of this movement was to ensure that women fulfilled
their prescribed role as mothers.97 As one feminist legal scholar has
explained, "criminal restrictions on abortion were enacted as caste
legislation, for the purposes of enforcing gender-specific family roles."
98
Many opponents of abortion rights have relied recently on the
stereotype of women as weak and vulnerable, and therefore in need of
protection, in support of their efforts to abolish or severely restrict women's
access to abortion.99 This is known as the "woman-protective argument."' 00
The implication of this stereotype is that, owing to their weaknesses and
vulnerability, women need to be "protected" through restrictive abortion
laws, policies and practices, so that they do not succumb to the
misrepresentations, coercion, or pressure of their doctors, partners, or
family members who want them to obtain an abortion, or to their own
mistaken or flawed decision-making.' 0' Implicit in this reasoning is the
further stereotype of women as incompetent decision-makers, which
implies that women are irrational and lack the capacity for moral agency
and reproductive self-determination, and should therefore be denied access
to reproductive health services.
94. Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 992-93 (2007) [hereinafter
Siegel, New Politics].
95. Id. at 999-1000.
96. Cook & Howard, supra note 62, at 1050.
97. Siegel, New Politics, supra note 94, at 1001.
98. Id. at 1002.
99. Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DuKE L.J. 1641 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel,
The Right's Reasons]; see also Siegel, New Politics, supra note 94, at 1008-09.
100. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity]; Siegel, New
Politics, supra note 94, at 992; see also Siegel, The Right's Reasons, supra note 99, at 1649;
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding federal legislation prohibiting partial-
birth abortion in part to protect the women choosing to have the abortion).
101. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007).
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It has been argued that the woman-protective rationale for restrictive
abortion laws, policies and practices is substantiated by narrative evidence,
including stories of women who have been led "unknowingly" into having
abortion, and empirical evidence comprised of reports of psychological
distress following the abortion, known as post-abortion syndrome.'12 This
evidence, however specious and incorrect, has been used to buttress the
false stereotype of women as weak and vulnerable, and therefore in need of
protection.
103
There are situational and broader factors that help to perpetuate the
stereotype of women as weak and vulnerable and the stereotype of women
as incompetent decision-makers in the reproductive health context. The
health sector tends to be very hierarchical in that men generally fill the
higher, more prestigious positions of medical doctors, while the lower, less
prestigious positions of nurses tend to be filled by women.' 4 This gender
hierarchy adds to a tendency of privileging men's medical decision-making
and ignoring women's interests and needs to make their own health
decisions. 10 5  These situational factors in the health sector are further
exacerbated by a broader ideology of patriarchy that enables the
subordination of women generally, and the control of their sexuality and
reproduction more specifically.
106
In 2007, in Gonzales v. Carhart,10 7 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
prohibition of a particular method of late term abortion in the federal
"Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003."' 108 In so holding, a majority of the
Court perpetuated the stereotype of women as weak and vulnerable and the
stereotype of women as incompetent decision-makers. Justice Kennedy,
delivering the majority opinion, reasoned that it is permissible to outlaw the
particular method, even if indicated to protect women's health, on the basis
that if women could use such a method, they would come to regret their
decision:
102. Siegel, The Right's Reasons, supra note 99, at 1651-56.
103. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (admitting a lack of evidence regarding the effect
abortions have on women yet concluding that some women do regret their choice to have an
abortion); Siegel, The Right's Reasons, supra note 99, at 1686-88.
104. SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICs & HEALTH CARE 228-29
(1992).
105. Id. at 229.
106. Id. at 99-108.
107. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156; Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 87-88.
108. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159-60.
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Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral
decision. While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it
seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow.1
0 9
In so reasoning, Justice Kennedy demonstrated his receptiveness to the
woman-protective argument. In his view, if women were stronger and less
vulnerable and if they were competent decision-makers, they would not opt
to have the abortions that many of them "come to regret" and that result in
"[s]evere depression and loss of esteem. . .. "10 As women are weak and
vulnerable as well as incompetent decision-makers, according to this
reasoning, the Court was justified in "protecting" women by upholding the
prohibition on a late-term abortion method, even though the method had
been indicated to promote women's health.1"
The immediate effect of this stereotypical reasoning was to deny
women access to a particular method of late-term abortion that might well
be safer and more acceptable for them." 2 Prohibiting access to this method
severely restricted the ability of women in the later stages of pregnancy to
make an autonomous decision about the selection of an abortion method,
and sent a clear message that women and their decision-making abilities are
less valued in society."13
In upholding the ban on "partial-birth" abortion, the majority in
Carhart violated the dignity of women who are neither weak and
vulnerable nor incompetent decision-makers and who, therefore, are not in
need of "protection" in the form of restrictive abortion laws and policies.
Justice Kennedy failed to recognize women's intrinsic and equal worth as
human beings; his reasoning treats women as less capable or competent
than men in respect of their decision-making capacities, by virtue only of
the fact that they are women.
14
In a well-reasoned dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg, the Court's
only female justice at the time of the decision, challenged the majority's
109. Id. at 159.
110. Id.
111. See id. (declaring that the "lack of information concerning the way in which the
fetus will be killed... is of legitimate concern to the state .... The state has an interest in
ensuring so grave a choice is well informed").
112. See id. at 161 (discussing evidence which supports the medical advantages of
partial-birth abortion procedures).
113. Id. at 163.
114. Siegel, Dignity, supra note 100, at 1698.
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reliance on stereotypes of women as a legitimate basis for denying women
their agency and autonomy." 5 She noted how "at stake in cases challenging
abortion restrictions is a woman's 'control over her [own] destiny.""'
l 6
Women, she explained, have the talent, capacity, and right to participate
equally with men in public life and their ability to realize their full potential
is intimately connected to "their ability to control their reproductive
lives." Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion
procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy;
rather, they center on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature." 7
Justice Ginsburg also noted:
[Tihe Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly
has no reliable evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret
their choices, and consequently suffer from "[s]evere depression and
loss of esteem." Because of women's fragile emotional state and
because of the "bond of love the mother has for her child," the Court
worries, doctors may withhold information about the nature of
the... procedure. The solution the Court approves, then, is not to
require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the
different procedures and their attendant risks. Instead, the Court
deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the
expense of their safety. This way of thinking reflects ancient notions
about women's place in the family and under the Constitution-ideas
that have long since been discredited.18
Justice Ginsburg discredits the majority's use of paternalistic
stereotypes of women as weak and vulnerable, and incompetent decision-
makers in need of protection through legislation. She helpfully says the
stereotype denies women "equal citizenship stature... ," laying the
groundwork to hold in a possible future decision that the use of this
paternalistic gender stereotyping in the health sector is a form of
discrimination that the U.S. Congress is obligated not to perpetuate in
federal law."19
115. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 171.
117. Id. at 171-72.
118. Id. at 183-85.
119. Id. at 191.
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III. State Obligations to Eliminate Gender Stereotyping in the
Health Sector
Notwithstanding the considerable harms that women have experienced
as a result of wrongful gender stereotyping in the health sector, there has
been limited discussion in legal scholarship or jurisprudence to date
regarding states' obligations to eliminate this practice. Part III seeks to
explore those legal obligations, using the normative framework set forth in
CEDAW. 120 In so doing, it asks:
* What are the nature and scope of States Parties' obligations
under CEDAW to eliminate gender stereotyping?
* What is the application of those obligations in the health care
context, particularly respecting women's reproductive health?
* What steps are States Parties required to take to eliminate
stereotypes, such as those that stereotype women as primarily
mothers, as weak and vulnerable, or as incompetent decision
makers, which inhibit or prohibit women's access to health
services or otherwise compromise their health?
21
States Parties are obligated, under CEDAW, to "eliminate all forms of
discrimination against women with a view to achieving women's de jure
and de facto equality with men in the enjoyment of their human rights and
fundamental freedoms.'0 22 In order to fulfill their CEDAW obligations,
States Parties must satisfy three core obligations:
Firstly, States parties' obligation is to ensure that there is no direct or
indirect discrimination against women in their laws and that women are
protected against discrimination-committed by public authorities, the
judiciary, organizations, enterprises or private individuals-in the public
as well as the private spheres by competent tribunals as well as sanctions
and other remedies. Secondly, States parties' obligation is to improve
the de facto position of women through concrete and effective policies
and programmes. Thirdly, States parties' obligation is to address
prevailing gender relations and the persistence of gender-based
stereotypes that affect women not only through individual acts by
individuals but also in law, and legal and societal structures and
institutions. 
123
120. CEDAW Arts. 1-5, 12, 16(l)(e).
121. See supra Part II.B.
122. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, supra note 88,
paragraph 4.
123. Id. paragraph 7 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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It is thus important, but not sufficient, for States Parties to adopt a
formal (i.e., de jure) approach to equality.1 24 In addition to treating men
and women identically where their interests are substantially similar, States
Parties must approach equality in a substantive (i.e., de facto) way, by
which is meant that they must address past discrimination against women,
accommodate biological and socially and culturally constructed differences
between men and women, and eliminate the root causes and consequences
of discrimination.125  For the purpose of the present discussion, it is
particularly significant that not only are States Parties required to eliminate
wrongful gender stereotyping, but that that obligation is also central to their
full compliance with CEDAW.1
26
States Parties' obligations to eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping
derive principally from Articles 5(a) and 2(f) of CEDAW. Article 5(a) of
CEDAW requires States Parties to take all appropriate measures to "modify
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." Article
2(f) requires States Parties "to take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and
practices that constitute discrimination against women." Article 5(a) of
CEDAW is applicable to a prejudice or practice that is based on a
stereotype related to the inferiority or superiority of men or women or a
sex-role stereotype of either sex, whereas Article 2(f) is applicable only
upon showing that a law, regulation, custom, or practice applied a gender
stereotype that resulted in discrimination against women.
27
Consistent with CEDAW's definition of discrimination against
women, direct discrimination on the ground of gender stereotyping may
occur when a distinction, exclusion, or restriction is made on the basis of a
stereotype that has the purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment, or exercise by women, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of their human rights. 128 Judicial reasoning that denies women
124. Id. paragraph 8; see also CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 16, supra
note 88, paragraph 7.
125. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, supra note 122, at
paragraphs 8, 10, 14.
126. Id. paragraph 6.
127. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 5, 72.
128. See CEDAW Art. 1 (defining "discrimination against women" as "any distinction,
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing
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access to certain abortion services because of a stereotypical belief that they
are weak and vulnerable or a belief that they are incompetent decision-
makers, as seen in Gonzales v. Carhart, is an example of direct
discrimination.
129
Indirect discrimination against women may occur when a law, policy,
or practice is facially neutral but has the effect of impairing or nullifying
the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by women, on a basis of equality of
men and women, of their human rights and fundamental freedoms because
it perpetuates a gender stereotype.130 An example of indirect discrimination
is the Manila City Executive Order, which, although it neutrally denies men
and women access to contraceptives in public health facilities, exposes only
women to the risk of unintended pregnancy and its health consequences.'
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Because gender stereotyping does not occur in a vacuum, the
obligations imposed on States Parties under Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of
CEDAW should be read together with the other obligations in CEDAW, as
well as with the obligations imposed on States Parties in other international
human rights treaties. 132 Even where there is no explicit textual support in
CEDAW for eliminating wrongful gender stereotyping, the CEDAW
Committee has interpreted different substantive rights and freedoms as
requiring the elimination of gender stereotyping.13 3 For example, in its
General Recommendation No. 19, the CEDAW Committee stated that
States Parties are required to eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping that
fosters and/or condones gender-based violence against women. 1
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In the reproductive health context, it is imperative that Articles 2(f)
and 5(a) of CEDAW are read in conjunction with Article 12. Article 12 of
CEDAW requires States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field"); see also CESCR
Committee, General Comment No. 20, supra note 88, paragraphs. 20, 35; CESCR
Committee, General Comment No. 16, supra note 88, paragraphs 11-13, 19; Cusack and
Cook, supra note 1, at 114-15.
129. See supra Part 11.B.
130. Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 115-17.
131. LIKHAAN ETAL., supra note 64, at 37.
132. RiKK HOLTMAAT, TOWARDS DIFFERENT LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF ARTICLE 5A CEDAW FOR THE ELIMINATION OF STRUCTURAL GENERAL
DISCRIMINATION 74-75 (2004); see also Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 75.
133. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against
Women, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992), paragraphs 1, 2, 11, 12.
134. Id. paragraphs 10-11.
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against women in the health sector. Article 12(1) requires States Parties to
"take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in
the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women, access to health care services, including those related to family
planning." Article 12(2) further requires States Parties to "ensure to women
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the
post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as
adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation." Related to Article 12
of CEDAW is Article 16(1)(e), which provides that States Parties shall take
all appropriate measures to ensure that men and women have "[t]he same
rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their
children and to have access to the information, education and means to
enable them to exercise these rights." The CEDAW Committee has
amplified the content and meaning of these rights in its General
Recommendation No. 24, noting that where health systems fail to provide
health services that only women need, such as emergency contraception and
safe and lawful abortion services, it is a form of discrimination that States
Parties are obligated to remedy.1
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Neither Articles 12 nor 16(1)(e) of CEDAW expressly requires States
Parties to eliminate gender stereotyping in the health context. However,
when those provisions are interpreted in light of CEDAW's overarching
object and purpose to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women,
and the principle that human rights treaties are to be interpreted generously
is taken into account, it is apparent that eliminating wrongful gender
stereotyping is critical to States Parties' full compliance with CEDAW.
As the obligations in Articles 2(f) and 5(a) are overarching and cross-
cutting, the nature and extent of obligations imposed on States Parties to
eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping will vary according to each
obligation in CEDAW that is implicated. One way to conceptualize the
scope of States Parties' obligations to eliminate wrongful gender
stereotyping in the reproductive health context is through the tripartite
framework of state obligations, which incorporates the obligation to
respect, protect, and fulfill fundamental human rights and freedoms.
136
Obligation to respect. The obligation to respect requires all branches
of government to refrain from gender stereotyping that impairs or nullifies
135. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 24, Art. 12 (Twentieth sess.,
1999), Women and Health, U.N. Doc. A/54/38Rev. (1999), paragraph 11 [hereinafter
CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 24].
136. CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 16, supra note 88, paragraphs 17-21;
see also Cusack and Cook, supra note 1, at 76-84.
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women's equal rights to the highest attainable standard of health, including
reproductive health, and to decide freely and responsibly on whether and
when to have children.' 37 Legislatures must ensure that they refrain from
stereotyping women when enacting laws 138 that impact the availability,
accessibility, acceptability and quality of reproductive health care services
and information. For example, they must ensure that proposed laws do not
stereotype women solely into childbearing and childrearing roles, and are
not based on gendered assumptions that degrade women in the clinical
setting or infringe on or deny their access to reproductive health care.
Executive branches must ensure that they do not rely on gender
stereotypes in their policies, practices, or programs, so as to nullify or
impair women's equal rights to the highest attainable standard of health and
to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their
children. 39  In introducing the Manila City Executive Order, Mayor
Atienza explicitly enforced a stereotype of women as primarily mothers,
thereby denying women these rights.140 The act of introducing the Order
thus not only violated Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW, but also Articles
12 and 16(1)(e).
Judiciaries must refrain from gender stereotyping in their reasoning'
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in ways that harm women's reproductive health and autonomy. Court
decisions that apply, enforce, or perpetuate gender stereotypes not only
deny the rights of the individual woman who is before the court, but also
degrade similarly situated women by perpetuating wrongful gender
stereotypes of the subgroup of women to which they belong. Stereotyping
of this nature thus creates individual and collective harms and defeats the
judicial commitment to justice. In prohibiting a particular method of late
term abortion in Gonzales v. Carhart, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
chose to perpetuate stereotypes of women as weak and vulnerable and as
incompetent decision-makers, rather than to refrain from wrongful gender
stereotyping.
142
137. Id. paragraph 18.
138. L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 33, at 99.
139. CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 16, supra note 88, paragraph 18.
140. Exec. Order No. 003, supra note 64; LIKHAAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 39-44.
141. See R v. Ewanchuk, 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can. Supreme 1999), paragraph 95
(L'Heureux-Dubd, J., concurring) (noting that "[c]omplainants should be able to rely on a
[judicial] system free from myths and stereotypes, and on a judiciary whose impartiality is
not compromised by these biased assumptions"); L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 33, at 92.
142. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007).
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Obligation to protect. The obligation to protect requires all branches
of government to take appropriate measures to prevent wrongful gender
stereotyping by non-state actors.1 43 As the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights has explained, "[t]he obligation to protect requires
States parties to take steps aimed directly at the elimination of prejudices,
customary and all other practices that perpetuate the notion of inferiority or
superiority of either of the sexes, and stereotyped roles for men and
women."'144  This obligation extends to providing ongoing training
programs and educational campaigns regarding the harms of stereotyping
and introducing laws, policies, and programs that seek to deter non-state
actors from wrongful gender stereotyping in the health sector. This would
require identifying, naming and eliminating wrongful gender stereotyping
in health services, including private hospital corporations that operate
within publicly funded health insurance schemes and other non-state actors
that exercise influence over women's access to reproductive health services
and information.
Obligation to fulfill. The obligation to fulfill women's equal rights to
the highest attainable standard of health and to decide freely and
responsibly on the number and spacing of their children, requires States
Parties to take appropriate legislative, judicial, administrative, budgetary,
economic, and other measures to ensure the elimination of wrongful gender
stereotyping.145 This obligation requires States Parties to establish the legal,
policy, and programmatic frameworks to understand, name, and eliminate
such stereotyping. States Parties might adopt positive measures to name the
operative gender stereotypes in the -health sector, show how they operate to
women's detriment, and provide appropriate measures to dismantle and
eliminate them.
The Executive, through its health ministry, might establish a review to
determine if and, if so, how, its laws, policies, and programs are grounded
in gender stereotypes. In an effort to ensure women's equal right to health,
the ministry might also produce guidelines that name common gender
stereotypes in the health context, explain how those stereotypes operate to
the detriment of women's health in general, and reproductive health in
143. See CEDAW Art. 2(e) (requiring States Parties to "take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise"); see also
Aoife Nolan, Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-State Actors
Through the Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the 'Obligation to
Protect', 9(2) HuMAN RTs. L. REv. 225 (2009).
144. CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 16, supra note 88, paragraph 19.
145. CEDAW Arts. 2(f), 5(a).
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particular, and identify whether they discriminate against women and
impede their access to essential, evidenced-based reproductive health care.
Guidelines might help to educate health personnel about the importance of
avoiding stereotypes when treating women.
Court opinions can be an important means of dismantling wrongful
stereotypes of women. By identifying the gender stereotypes implicit in the
reasoning of past decisions and exploring their historical and ideological
contexts, court opinions can assist in dismantling gender stereotypes and
thus prevent their legal perpetuation. An example of an opinion that
dismantled a gender stereotype is Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Gonzales v.
Carhart, which names and rationally condemns the stereotypical thinking
implicit and explicit in the majority's reasoning, and identifies past
decisions where stereotypical thinking has been identified and
dismantled.
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Another example is the 2006 opinion of Justices Arafijo Renteria and
Vargas Hermnndez of the Colombian Constitutional Court, which
liberalized Colombia's restrictive abortion law. 147 In that case, their Honors
found that there are limits on the power of the Legislature in criminal
matters. The Legislature is, for instance, prohibited from violating the
rights to dignity and to the free development of the individual, even when it
seeks to protect other constitutional values such as life. 48 The Justices
reasoned that "when the legislature enacts criminal laws, it cannot ignore
that a woman is a human being entitled to dignity and that she must be
treated as such, as opposed to being treated as a reproductive instrument for
the human race. The legislature must not impose the role of procreator on a
woman against her will.' 49 In naming the stereotype of women "as a
reproductive instrument for the human race," the Justices identified and
described the harmful assumption about women that had been embedded in
the criminal law. By refusing to allow that stereotypical assumption to be
perpetuated in their own reasoning, their Honors laid the foundation to
dismantle the stereotype of women as reproductive instruments and, in so
doing, affirmed women's right to substantive equality.
146. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 171-87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147. C-355/2006: EXCERPTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S RULING THAT
LIBERALIZED ABORTION IN COLOMBIA (2006), http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/
pdf pubs/pub c3552006.pdf (last accessed Oct. 27, 2009) (on file with Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
148. Id. at 36-37.
149. Id. at 36.
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IV Conclusion
The use of wrongful gender stereotypes in the health sector is rarely
explicit. As a result, there is a lack of understanding and consciousness of
how stereotypes operate to impede women's access to reproductive health
services and information, undermine women's ability to make decisions
concerning their own reproductive health, or otherwise compromise their
health and well-being. It is hoped that the methodology presented in this
Article of naming gender stereotypes in the health sector, and identifying
how they compromise women's health, discriminate against women, or
otherwise violate their human rights, will make it more likely that wrongful
gender stereotyping will be eliminated in the health context.
Moreover, it is hoped that the application of this methodology will
help to prevent the use of wrongful gender stereotyping as a backlash tactic
against women who do not conform to stereotypic roles or behavior, or as a
backlash tactic to undermine the empowering effects of laws enacted to
ensure women's access to reproductive health services. For example, in
Manila City, women are denied contraceptives through public health
facilities because contraceptives can prevent them, at least temporarily,
from conforming to a stereotypic role of motherhood or a role of a mother
sacrificing herself to the rearing of multiple children.' 50 Another example
of the use of wrongful gender stereotyping as a backlash tactic against
women is when health services deny them anesthesia in abortion services
because they allegedly do not conform to the stereotypic behavior of
chastity.'5 '
Hostile stereotypes may also emerge in the wake of law reform that
liberates women to move beyond stereotypes. For example, the view that
women are weak and vulnerable has emerged in the health context to
restrict women's access to certain forms of abortion services. The
stereotype of women as incompetent decision-makers, with its implication
that women lack moral agency, emerges with regularity in post-reform
eras.'52 Reforms include those that come with the expansion of distribution
of contraceptives, such as the distribution of emergency contraception
150. Exec. Order No. 003, supra note 64.
151. CHILDBIRTH BY CHOICE TRUST, No CHOICE: CANADIAN WOMEN TELL THEIR
STORIES OF ILLEGAL ABORTION 154 (1998); see also NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, ABORTION SERVICES REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE ABORTION SERVICES
REVIEW COMMITTEE (1992).
152. Siegel, Dignity, supra note 100, at 1773-95.
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through pharmacies," 3 or those reforms that liberalize abortion laws, such
as in Colombia. 54 Efforts to undermine these reforms are instigated by
those health care providers who try to deny women their moral agency.
They invoke their conscience to refuse to provide services to women, and
often refuse to refer women to alternative willing providers, ignoring their
professional responsibilities to respect patients' needs.
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The stereotypes of women that are explored in this Article are only
some of the ways in which societies generalize about women's roles and
capacities and, in so doing, deny them access to essential health services or
otherwise compromise their health. There is no doubt that other wrongful
gender stereotypes exist, and others will emerge depending on particular
situational factors in the health sector and the general articulation of
patriarchy in a particular country. The degree to which hostile stereotypes
are used as a backlash tactic against women who try to break free of
traditional female roles, or as a backlash technique to undermine legal
reforms to eliminate gender discrimination, will also vary.
Finally, it is also hoped that the insights on how CEDAW can be more
effectively applied to name, identify, and eliminate the gender stereotypes
that operate to deny health services to women, will contribute to a more
robust use of the African Protocol to dismantle the stereotypes operative in
various African countries that violate women's rights relating to their
health.
153. See Pichon & Sajous v. France, App. No. 49853/992001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 3
(holding that French pharmacists could not refuse to sell contraceptives on the basis of
religious freedom); Smearman, supra note 9.
154. C-355/2006: EXCERPTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S RULING THAT
LIBERALIZED ABORTION IN COLOMBIA (2006), http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/
pdf pubs/pub-c3552006.pdf (last accessed October 27, 2009) (on file with Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
155. Rebecca J. Cook, M6nica Arango Olaya & Bernard M. Dickens, Healthcare
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(2009).
